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Abstract
Changes in total surplus and deadweight loss are traditional mea-
sures of economic welfare. We propose necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for rationalizing consumer demand data with a quasilinear utility
function. Under these conditions, consumer surplus is a valid measure
of consumer welfare. For nonmarketed goods, we propose necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on market data for eﬃcient production , i.e.
production at minimum cost. Under these conditions we derive a cost
function for the nonmarketed good, where producer surplus is the area
above the marginal cost curve.
Keywords: Welfare economics, Quasilinear utilities, Nonmarketed goods,
Afriat inequalities
JEL Classiﬁcation: D11, D12, D21, D601 Introduction
Given a ﬁnite set of prices and consumption choices, we say that the data set
is rationalizable if there exists a concave, continuous and monotonic utility
function such that these choices are the maxima of the utility function over
the budget sets.1 Afriat (1967) provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a ﬁnite data set to be rationalizable, that is for observable choices to
be the result of the consumer maximizing her utility function subject to a
budget constraint. In a series of lucid papers Varian (1982), (1983) and (1984)
has illuminated our understanding and increased our appreciation of Afriat’s
seminal contributions to demand theory, Afriat (1967), and the theory of
production, Afriat (1972a). As a consequence there is now a growing and
vigorous literature on the testable restrictions of strategic and non-strategic
behavior of households and ﬁrms in market economies —see the survey of
Carvajal, et al (2004).
This paper is primarily about the economic welfare of agents. In applied
partial equilibrium models we often measure economic welfare in terms of to-
tal surplus, i.e., the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and deadweight
1Typically this data is obtained from market transactions, but for nonmarketed goods
it may have been obtained from stated preference methods, e.g. contingent valuation or
contingent choice —see Bockstael and McConnel (1998) for discussion.
1loss. As is well known, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer wel-
fare only if the consumer’s demand derives from maximizing a homothetic
or quasilinear utility function subject to her budget constraint —see section
11.5 in Silberberg (1990). Both Afriat (1972b) and Varian (1983) proposed
a necessary and suﬃcient combinatorial condition for rationalizing data sets,
consisting of market prices and consumer demands, with homothetic utility
functions. This condition is the homothetic axiom of revealed preference or
HARP. To our knowledge, there is no comparable result in the literature for
quasilinear rationalizations of consumer demand data. In this paper we show
that a combinatorial condition introduced in Rockafellar (1970) to character-
ize the subgradient correspondence for convex real-valued functions on Rn,
cyclical monotonicity or CM, is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
ﬁnite data set to be rationalizable with a quasilinear utility function.2
Measuring producer surplus for nonmarketed goods such as health, educa-
tion or environmental amenities and ascertaining if these goods are produced
eﬃciently, i.e., at minimum cost, are important issues in applied welfare eco-
2In the paper by Rochet (1987) “A necessary and suﬃcient condition for rationaliz-
ability in a quasilinear context” published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics he
deﬁnes rationalizability as implementability of an action proﬁle —X(·) from the set of
individual characteristics to the set of possible actions— via compensatory transfers, that
is if there exist transfer functions t(·) which make the mechanism (X(·),t(·)) truthfully
implementable in dominant strategies. Therefore the results presented in his paper are of
a diﬀerent nature, despite the title of his paper.
2nomics. Our contribution to the welfare literature on nonmarketed goods
is the observation that Afriat’s combinatorial condition, cyclical consistency
or CC, and equivalently Varian’s generalized axiom of revealed preference or
GARP, are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for rationalizing a ﬁnite data
set, consisting of factor demands and factor prices, with a concave, mono-
tone and continuous production function. Hence they constitute necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for nonmarketed goods to be produced at minimum
cost for some production function. If these conditions hold, then the supply
curve for the nonmarketed good is the marginal cost curve of the associated
cost function and producer surplus is well deﬁned. These combinatorial con-
ditions are equivalent to Varian’s cost minimizing inequalities where both
marginal costs and output levels are unobservable, see Varian (1984).
In the next section we present results characterizing rationalizability of
demand data with quasilinear utilities. In the ﬁnal section of the paper
we propose necessary and suﬃcient conditions on ﬁnite data sets of factor
demands and prices such that the nonmarketed goods are produced eﬃciently
and we derive the supply curves for such goods.
32 Rationalizing Demand Data with Quasilin-
ear Utilities
Afriat (1967) provides the ﬁrst non-parametric test for consumer behavior.
He provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition on ﬁnite data for it to be
rationalizable by a neoclassical utility function.
Deﬁnition 1 Let (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N be given. A utility function u ratio-





s.t.prx ≤ I = prxr
Theorem 1 (Afriat 1967) The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a concave, monotone, continuous, non-satiated utility func-
tion that rationalizes the data.
2. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N satisﬁes Afriat inequalities, that is, there
exists Ur > 0 and λr > 0 for r = 1,...,N such that
4Ur ≤ Ul + λlpl · (xr − xl) ∀r,l = 1,...,N
3. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N satisﬁes ”cyclical consistency”, that is,
prxr ≥ prxs, psxs ≥ psxt,···,pqxq ≥ pqxr
implies
prxr = prxs, psxs = psxt,···,pqxq = pqxr
Deﬁnition 2 Let (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N be given. The data is quasilinear





s.t.prx + yr = I
where U is a concave function and yr is the numeraire good.
5Deﬁnition 3 Let (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N be given. The data is cyclically
monotone if for any given subset of the data {(ps,xs)}m
s=1:
x1 · (p2 − p1) + x2 · (p3 − p2) + ··· + xm · (p1 − pm) ≥ 0
or equivalently:
p1 · (x2 − x1) + p2 · (x3 − x2) + ··· + pm · (x1 − xm) ≥ 0
Deﬁnition 4 If U is concave on Rn, then β ∈ Rn is a subgradient of U at
x if for all y ∈ Rn : U(y) ≤ U(x) + β · (y − x).
Deﬁnition 5 If U is a concave function on Rn, then ∂U(x) is the set
of subgradients of U at x.
Theorem 2 The following are equivalent:
1. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N is quasilinear rationalizable by a contin-
uous, concave, strictly monotone utility function U.
62. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N satisﬁes Afriat’s inequalities with con-
stant marginal utilities of income, that is, there exists Gr > 0 and λ > 0
for r = 1,...,N such that
Gr ≤ Gl + λpl · (xr − xl) ∀r,l = 1,...,N
or equivalently there exist Ur > 0 for r = 1,...,N
Ur ≤ Ul + pl · (xr − xl) ∀r,l = 1,...,N
where Ur = Gr
λ
3. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N is cyclically monotone.
Proof:
(1) ⇒ (2): From the FOC of the quasilinear utility maximization problem
we know:
∃βr ǫ ∂U(x), s.t. βr = λrpr where λr = 1
Also, U being concave implies that U(xr) ≤ U(xl) + βl(xr − xl) for
r,l = 1,2,...,N. Since βl = pl ∀l = 1,...,N we get U(xr) ≤ U(xl) +
7pl(xr − xl) ∀r,l = 1,...,N
(2) ⇒ (3): For any set of pairs {(xs,ps)}m
s=1 we need that: p0 · (x1 − x0) +
p1(x2 − x1) + ... + pm(x0 − xm) ≥ 0.
From the Afriat inequalities with constant marginal utilities of income we
know:
U1 − U0 ≤ p0 · (x1 − x0)
U2 − U1 ≤ p1 · (x2 − x1)
···
U0 − Um ≤ pm(x0 − xm)
Adding up these inequalities we see that the left hand sides cancel and
the resulting condition deﬁnes cyclical monotonicity.
(3) ⇒ (1): Let U(x) = inf{pm · (x − xm) + ... + p1 · (x2 − x1)} where
the inﬁmum is taken over all ﬁnite subsets of data, then U(x) is a concave
8function on Rn and pr is the subgradient of U at x = xr.3 Hence if λr = 1
for r = 1,...,N then
pr = ∂U(xr)
constitutes a solution to the ﬁrst order conditions of the quasilinear maxi-
mization problem.
If we require strict inequalities in (2) of Theorem 3, then it follows from
Lemma 2 in Chiappori and Rochet (1987) that the rationalization can be
chosen to be a C∞ function. It then follows from Roy’s identity that x(p) =
−
∂V (p)
∂p . Hence for any line integral we see that
R p2





V (p1) − V (p2). That is, consumer welfare is well-deﬁned and the change
in consumer surplus induced by a change in market prices is the change in
consumer’s welfare.
3This construction is due to Rockafellar (1970) in his proof of Theorem 24.8.
93 Rationalizing the Production of Nonmar-
keted Goods
Health, education and environmental amenities are all examples of nonmar-
keted goods. To compute producer surplus for such goods, we must derive
the supply curve, given only factor demands and prices. A policy issue of
some importance is whether these goods are produced eﬃciently, i.e. at min-
imum cost, given factor demands and prices. In fact, as we show, there may
be no concave, monotone and continuous production function that rational-
izes the input data. If one does exist, we can rationalize the data and derive
the supply curve for the nonmarketed good.
We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on a ﬁnite data set on fac-
tor inputs, xr, and factor prices, pr, to rationalize the data with a concave,
monotone and continuous production function, F. Given F we can derive the
cost function, an equivalent representation of the technology for producing
the nonmarketed good. Finally from the cost function we derive the supply
curve for this good, and producer surplus is well deﬁned.
10Deﬁnition 6 Let (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N be given. A production, F, ra-




qrF(x) − pr · x
where F is a concave function.
The rationalization is contained in Theorem 3, where the output price and
quantity, represented by qr and F(x) are unknown.
Theorem 3 The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a concave, monotone, continuous, non-satiated production
function that rationalizes the data.
2. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N satisﬁes Afriat inequalities, that is, there
exists Fr > 0 and qr > 0 for r = 1,...,N such that
Fr ≤ Fl +
1
ql
pl · (xr − xl) ∀r,l = 1,...,N
11where ql is the marginal cost of producing Fl.
3. The data (pr,xr), r = 1,...,N satisﬁes ”cyclical consistency”, that is,
prxr ≥ prxs, psxs ≥ psxt,···,pqxq ≥ pqxr
implies
prxr = prxs, psxs = psxt,···,pqxq = pqxr
Proof: This is Afriat’s (1967) result presented earlier in Theorem 1 where
we let F = U and λr = 1
qr.
If we write the cost minimization problem of the ﬁrm, minx∈Rn p · x s.t.
F(x) ≥ y, from the F.O.C. we ﬁnd p =  F ′(x), where   is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the constraint, and therefore is equal to the marginal
cost of producing one more unit of output at the optimum. Therefore it is
easy to see from the FOC of the proﬁt maximization problem that the out-
put price, qr, is the marginal cost of production. The inequalities in (2) are
the same as those in condition (3) of Theorem 2 in Varian (1984), where he
assumes that the production levels Fr are observable.
12F(x) = min1≤l≤r{Fl+ 1
qlpl(x−xl)} is Afriat’s utility (production) function
derived from a solution to the Afriat inequalities. The associated expenditure
(cost) function is c(y;p) = minx∈Rn p · x s.t. F(x) ≥ y. In the production
setting, the supply curve is the marginal cost curve.
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